In one short week in December 1989, Philippine President Corazon Aquino's political future suddenly turned bleak, and Philippine-U.S. relations were transformed.
Before the December coup attempt, Aquino repeatedly said that she was keeping her "options open" on whether or not to continue hosting the two biggest American military bases outside the United States. But as mutinous troops occupied several key installations in the country, bombed the presidential palace, and appeared to be on the verge of overthrowing her government last month, Aquino's options seemed to vanish as quickly as loyal soldiers defected to the mutineers. It took American fighter jets from Clark Air Base to save her government from collapsing; and this, to be sure, is now a crucial factor in determining the fate of the U.S. bases in the Philippines.
For the past two years, the Philippine and U.S. governments, as well as different pro-and anti-bases groups in both countries, have been gearing up for a major battle in the long debate over the U.S. military presence in the Philippines. The 1947 U.S. Military Bases Agreement, which covers Clark and Subic bases, is due to expire in 1991. The coming negotiations, which were supposed to start last December, have been postponed "indefinitely"--a word that presumably means early 1990.
Subic Naval Base is a major U.S. facility in the Pacific with nine separate commands. It is also the Seventh Fleet's primary port, training area, and logistics support base in the western Pacific. Clark Air Force Base is a principal link between the island base of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean and the outside world. More than 16,000 U.S. troops are stationed in the Philippines.
Despite Aquino's "open options" position, it has been suspected that she actually favors the retention of the bases, but that she intends to use the bases as bargaining chips for more U.S. aid in the coming talks. Last September, one member of Congress who is supportive of Aquino proposed a five-year extension of the lease on the bases for "purely economic considerations." The Aquino government now receives $480 million in annual compensation from the United States for the bases; in the coming negotiations, it reportedly will push for $1 billion in yearly aid in return for a new treaty.
But chances are that it won't get that amount, given the U.S. budget deficit crisis. During a visit to the Philippines early last year, Rep. Patricia Schroeder (D-Colo.) called the Aquino government's reported demand "crazy."
Moreover, the Aquino government's ability to haggle with U.S. officials for a higher price is doubtful. In the 1988 review of the present agreement, Philippine negotiators, led by Foreign Secretary Raul Manglapus, ended up agreeing to a sum far below the Aquino government's original demand.
Philippine and U.S. officials are also worried about a provision in the Philippine Constitution banning nuclear weapons in Philippine territory. Nuclear weapons are believed to be stored at both Clark and Subic, though U.S. officials have refused to either confirm or deny this. To sidestep the ban, Aquino and the Americans are expected to invoke a constitutional loophole that the ban shall be enforced "consistent with the national interest." But tampering with the charter to accommodate U.S. interests may mean exposing Aquino to more charges of insincerity and subservience to a foreign power.
FOR A NEW BASES AGREEMENT to become a treaty, it must be approved by two-thirds of the Philippine Senate. Last year, 15 of the 23 senators said they would oppose a new treaty and push for the immediate shut-down of the bases when the treaty expires.
A small but growing anti-bases movement in the Philippines has been focusing attention on the issues that the government has chosen to gloss over. In January 1989, peace and anti-bases groups held a much-publicized "peace caravan" from Manila to the different towns and cities on the out-skirts of the Clark and Subic bases. Joining the Philippine movement were organizations and personalities from Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and other Southeast Asian countries.
In November, just weeks before the coup attempt was launched, a broad, multisectoral anti-bases coalition was formed in time for the coming negotiations, with the participation of some Philippine senators, congresspersons, and church officials. A key figure in the anti-bases movement is Sen. Joseph Estrada, a former movie star who has become one of the most outspoken opponents of U.S. policy in the Philippines. Last year, he produced and starred in a highly successful, commercial movie titled In the Claws of the Eagle, which condemned the U.S. military presence in the Philippines.
The anti-bases campaign has clearly been effective. Though polls indicate that most Filipinos still favor retention of the bases, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of those opposed to a new treaty. In fact, according to the polls, a significant portion of the population is not even aware of the existence of the bases. Anti-bases activists believe that a sustained national education campaign could swing public opinion against a new agreement.
The arguments against the bases range from the legal to the moral. Clark and Subic are legacies of American colonial rule in the Philippines; more than 200,000 Filipinos were killed in the first quarter of the 20th century in the struggle for independence from Americans. The bases also served as magnets for external attack in World War II, when the Philippines was one of the first targets of Japanese invasion because of the U.S. military presence.
The presence of Americans has also turned the towns and cities around the U.S. facilities into a den of criminality. Olongapo City, near Subic, and Angeles City, near Clark, are now the two main rest-and-recreation centers for U.S. military personnel; and in both cities, prostitution, gambling, and illegal drug trafficking are the major economic activities. Civic and women's groups have been outraged by the decadence and exploitation in both cities. Olongapo's horrible reality is symbolized in one case that reached national prominence: A 14-year-old child prostitute died from an infection in her ovary that resulted from one of her clients leaving the broken tip of a vibrator inside her vagina.
FOR NATIONALISTS AND PEACE activists, the U.S. military presence in the Philippines makes a mockery of Philippine sovereignty and could pull the country into un-wanted conflicts with other nations. Clark and Subic have historically been used as springboards of U.S. intervention in the Middle East and the Asia Pacific region. Both facilities played roles in the Korean and Vietnam Wars. And Subic served as a staging ground for U.S. intervention in the Persian Gulf, 3,600 miles away, during the Tanker War of 1987-88.
U.S. and Philippine officials claim that the bases are vital to national and regional security, and serve as checks against Soviet military ambitions in the Asia Pacific. They often cite the Soviet base at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam as a possible threat to Philippine security. And U.S. Embassy officials do their utmost through public statements to keep the Cold War alive in the Philippines.
But developments in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have; made the Soviet threat less convincing to Filipinos. In 1988, Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev offered to pull the Soviet troops out from Cam Ranh Bay if the U.S. withdrew from Clark and Subic. Immediately after this announce-ment, U.S. officials began belittling the significance of the Soviet presence at Cam Ranh Bay. Last year, the chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Philippine House of Representatives warned of possible "military incursions" by neighboring Malaysia if the bases were removed.
The decisive role that American fighter jets from Clark played in putting down the December coup attempt has provided the United States with fresh ammunition in the debate over a new treaty. Immediately after the failed coup, Rep. Stephen Solarz (D-N. Y.), chair of the House Foreign Affairs subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, commented that U.S. military assistance in defeating the rebellion showed the Filipino people that the bases "are not there to subvert but to save Filipino democracy."
At least two Philippine senators who had been opposed to the bases have had a change of heart regarding their position. The coup also has weakened the Aquino government's ability to bargain. Many believe that Aquino now has no choice but to retain the bases on U.S. terms or risk being overthrown in another coup.
U.S. SUPPORT FOR PHILIPPINE administrations has historically centered on the ruling government's commitment and ability to protect the bases, as in the case of the Marcos dictatorship, which received the full support of five successive U.S. administrations. Before the fall of Marcos, former President Reagan was asked which was more important, the bases or Philippine democracy. Reagan replied, "One cannot minimize the importance of those bases."
But a new treaty does not automatically mean stability for the Aquino government. The rebellion, aside from unmasking Aquino's shaky base of support, also exposed a serious crack in the Philippine military. Another coup attempt is almost certain unless Aquino is able to eliminate or neutralize the coup leaders, or the different factions of the military are reconciled. The next time could be fatal for Aquino and potentially damaging to U.S. interests in the Philippines.
Ironically, the United States is actually the main patron of the Philippine military. The Philippine Constabulary was formed by the American colonial regime to fight the Filipino resistance movement in the 1920s and '30s. The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) gets most of its arms and training from the United States; the Philippine Military Academy, where some of the coup leaders are from, was patterned after West Point. In fact, a number of military officers are themselves West Point graduates, including one of the coup commanders and a now significantly weakened Defense Secretary Fidel Ramos.
The Marcos regime oversaw the rapid growth and politicization of the military. Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honason and other coup leaders represent a new breed of officers who believe that only under a military-civilian junta could the country's problems be solved.
While it turned the tide in favor of the Aquino government, U.S. intervention in the rebellion has antagonized a number of junior military officers, including those who did not participate in the coup. It has also stirred up feelings of anti-Americanism among officers and soldiers of the AFP, some of whom have publicly expressed their outrage over the U.S. role in quelling the coup.
This and Aquino's dismal failure in uniting and maintaining control over the military may force the United States to rethink its support for her government: A staunchly pro-United States, but highly unstable, government is still a liability to U.S. interests in the Philippines.
For Aquino, using the United States and the military as her bases of support is proving to be a terrible mistake. Asking for U.S. help to defeat the rebellion has, so far, been Aquino's most humiliating act in her nearly four years as president. Her decision to abandon the progressive forces of People Power and implement essentially the same economic and military policies of the Marcos dictatorship has led to the erosion of her popular support. Once the charismatic leader of a glorious uprising, Aquino is now widely viewed by friends and adversaries as the beleaguered head of state beholden to a foreign power.
Aquino's only hope to shatter that image is to throw her support behind the popular movement to remove the bases, which includes the forces that swept her into power in 1986. Otherwise, the only U.S. plane to save her next time may be the one sent to fly her out of Manila.
Benjamin Pimentel was a staff writer for National Midweek, a magazine based in Manila, when this article appeared.
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